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The health risks and resource hazards created by pollution in the United States fall most
heavily on lower-income and minority groups.
1 Contrary to general public perception that
environmental hazards are borne equally, the risks and accompanying burdens of exposure to
environmental contaminants are distributed disproportionately along racial and class lines.
2
The concept of environmental justice emerged as a reaction to growing concern about the
inequitable distribution of environmental hazards along racial lines. The environmental justice
movement has received much recent attention as being an extension of the civil rights
movement, where advocates have demanded fair distribution of environmental benefits and
burdens.
3
This paper will focus on the difficulty that plaintiffs wishing to challenge hazardous
waste siting in their communities have in proving that the siting decision was based on racial
factors. Part 1 will examine a North Carolina case that illustrates the potential that substantive
and procedural requirements have in protecting communities from environmental injustice.
Part 2 will focus on the emergence of the concept of environmental racism and early research
studies that examined the phenomenon. Part 3 will discuss the distinction between
environmental racism and environmental justice. Part 4 will examine the difficulties that
surround the use of the Equal Protection Clause by plaintiffs who challenge hazardous waste
siting in their communities. Part 5 will examine Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as it
has been used in environmental justice cases. Part 6 will discuss Chester Concerned for
Quality Living v. Seif, a Third Circuit Court environmental justice case in which plaintiffs
challenged the siting of a hazardous waste facility in their community under Title VI. Part 7
will focus on post-Chester environmental justice developments. Finally, Part 8 will explore
substantive and procedural requirements designed to encourage community involvement in
siting decisions.
                                                
1 See Jill E. Evans, Challenging the Racism in Environmental Racism: Redefining the Concept of Intent, 40
AZ. L. REV. 1219, 1225 (1998).
2 See id.
3 See Alice Kaswan, Environmental Laws: Grist for the Equal Protection Mill, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 397
(1999).2
1. HOLLY SPRINGS, NORTH CAROLINA
In the early 1990s, Wake County, North Carolina, decided that it needed to obtain additional
space for a solid-waste sanitary landfill in order to accommodate the county’s increasing
waste disposal needs.
4 On April 6, 1992, the Wake County Board of Commissioners directed
county staff to pursue plans to laterally expand the boundaries of a solid waste landfill located
on the outskirts of Holly Springs.
5 The landfill had been in existence since the 1970s, and the
county planned to laterally expand the landfill by approximately 480 acres, 310 of which were
located within the jurisdictional limits of Holly Springs.
6 Holly Springs gave its approval for
the expansion in September 1992.
7 In December 1994, however, the county submitted to the
Department of Environmental and Natural Resources (DENR) a site plan application for a
new facility.
8 Two years later, Wake County submitted to DENR an application for a permit
to construct.
9 But on May 19, 1998, Holly Springs withdrew its 1992 approval for
expansion.
10 Reasons cited for the withdrawal were that Holly Springs did not give approval
for a new facility and that the town had experienced rapid population growth.
11 In 1992, the
town’s population was about 1,000, but at the time the town withdrew its permission for
expansion the population was close to 10,000.
12
North Carolina law distinguishes “lateral expansion” from a “new” facility. A lateral
expansion is defined as a “horizontal expansion of the waste boundaries of an existing
Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Facility (MSWLF)”.
13 A new facility, however, is any
municipal solid-waste landfill unit that has not received waste prior to October 9, 1993.
14 The
administrative law judge concluded that the landfill which was the subject of the permit at
issue was not a lateral expansion, but rather a new facility completely separate from the old
one, which was required by regulation to be closed in 1998.
15 The judge analogized that “a
permit to construct an addition to a home is not the same thing as a permit to construct a
whole new home.”
16 Thus, the permit was set aside because the county never secured proper
approval from Holly Springs for permission to build a new facility.
The judge had further support for the decision to grant the plaintiffs’ summary judgment
motion. Holly Springs had never enacted a franchise allowing Wake County to operate a
landfill inside the town. In North Carolina, in order to operate a public utility within the
                                                
4 See Franks et al. v. North Carolina Department of Environment & Natural Resources, 99 HER 0344, 380









13 See 15A N.C.A.C. 13B.602(14).
14 See 15A N.C.A.C. 13B.602(18).
15 See Franks, supra note 178.
16 See id.3
corporate limits of a municipality, the operator must obtain a franchise from the
municipality.
17 The North Carolina General Statutes define the operation of a solid waste
landfill as a public utility.
18 Furthermore, in order to operate a public utility within a city’s
limits, the city must grant a franchise to the operator.
19 A franchise cannot be granted unless it
has been passed at two regularly scheduled meetings of the governing board.
20 The judge
concluded that Wake County did not obtain a franchise to operate a landfill from Holly
Springs.
21 The town’s approval was at most a license, which could be revoked at any time.
Therefore, the revocation was effective, and the permit was set aside.
22
Local government approval is required before a landfill can be located within the
jurisdictional limits of a town or county.
23 Additionally, prior to the issuance of approval there
must be public notice and a public hearing regarding the landfill site.
24 The judge concluded
that the residents of Holly Springs or Wake County had never received the required notice or
opportunity to be heard.
25
The regulations that require local government approval to site a landfill in a community
and the operator of a landfill to obtain a franchise from the municipality are procedures that
implement N.C.G.S. § 130A-294. This statute requires a franchise granted for a sanitary
landfill to include a description of the geographic area and population to be served, a
description of the volume of the waste stream, and a projection of the useful life of the
landfill.
26 Furthermore, the statute requires certain actions to be taken if there has been a
“substantial amendment” to a permit application.
27 A “substantial amendment” is defined as
an increase of 10 percent or more in: (1) the population of the geographic area to be served by
the landfill, (2) the quantity of solid waste to be disposed of in the landfill, or (3) the
geographic area to be served by the landfill.
28 Once there has been a substantial amendment to
the permit application, the mandatory requirements of § 130A-294(a)(b1)(2-3) (adoption of a
franchise and holding of a public hearing) are triggered.
29
The administrative law judge found that the permit application for the Holly Springs
landfill had been “substantially amended.”
30 From the time of the initial site approval of
expansion in 1992 to DENR’s submission of a permit to construct a new facility in 1996,
                                                
17 See N.C.G.S. § 160A-311.
18 See N.C.G.S. § 160A-311(6).
19 See N.C.G.S. § 160A-76.
20 See id.
21 See Franks, supra note 178.
22 See id.
23 See 15A N.C.A.C. 13B.1618.
24 See 15A N.C.A.C. 13B.1618(c)(5)(A)(i-iv)
25 See Franks, supra note 178.
26 See N.C.G.S. § 130A-294(b1)(3).
27 See N.C.G.S. § 130A-294(a)(b1)(1)(a)(1-3).
28 See id.
29 See Franks, supra note 178.
30 See id.4
Holly Springs had undergone significant population growth.
31 When Wake County submitted
its site plan application in 1992, it based the annual population growth rate at 3 percent.
32 The
actual growth rate for Wake County, however, has been 6 percent.
33 By the time the landfill
would have opened in 2003, the population of Wake County would have increased by more
than 10 percent over the initial population projections based on a 3 percent growth rate.
34
Accordingly, the permit application had been “substantially amended,” thus requiring the
applicant to conduct public hearings and obtain a franchise.
35
 Holly Springs plaintiffs relied on one other statute to support their argument that the
town did not give the county permission to construct a new landfill within the town’s
jurisdiction. The statute mandated that “the board of commissioners of a county shall consider
alternative sites and socioeconomic and demographic data and shall hold a public hearing
prior to selecting or approving a site for a new sanitary landfill…that is located within one
mile of an existing sanitary landfill….”
36 The landfill that was the subject of the controversy
in the Holly Springs case was within one mile of the old landfill.
37 The judge found that Wake
County did not comply with the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 513A-136(c) because it did not
conduct public hearings, did not consider alternative sites, and did not consider
socioeconomic data.
38
As the above discussion indicates, a prospective landfill operator in North Carolina is
required by law to follow various substantive and procedural requirements in order to
construct a landfill. A potential operator must obtain a franchise to operate a public utility
39
and receive local government approval.
40 Furthermore, county decision makers must consider
alternative sites and socioeconomic and demographic data prior to approving a site.
41 These
requirements serve to inform and protect the people who may have to live with a hazardous
waste facility in their community.
The requirements ensure that both the residents of the community and the operator of the
facility have an opportunity to participate throughout the decision-making process. This
participation in the decision-making process allows community members to learn about the
burdens and benefits that come with hazardous waste facilities and allows them to voice their
concerns. The facility operator in turn has incentive to work with the community to ensure
that the benefits are maximized and the burdens are minimized. Failure to cooperate in the
process can lead, as it did in Holly Springs, to the denial of a permit to operate a facility.






36 See N.C.G.S. § 153A-136(c)(1).
37 See Franks, supra note 178.
38 See id.
39 See N.C.G.S. § 160A-311.
40 See N.C.G.S. § 513A-136.
41 See id.5
Another advantage that substantive and procedural requirements offer communities at
risk for hazardous waste siting is allowing environmental justice plaintiffs to avoid the
difficulties posed by the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI claims. Plaintiffs do not have to
show discriminatory intent or provide evidence of disparate impact. Of course, prospective
operators of hazardous waste facilities will learn to carefully follow substantive and
procedural requirements so that they can receive permits to construct and operate facilities.
The requirement of local approval, therefore, is important. Communities trying to attract jobs
to the area can also express concern about minimizing residents’ exposure to pollutants. If the
benefits of having hazardous waste facilities are outweighed by the burdens, communities
have the ability to deny permits. Eventually facility operators will be forced to create adequate
benefits in order to receive local approval for permits.
It is inevitable that Wake County will construct a new landfill somewhere. Evidence
presented in the Holly Springs case indicates that the county has experienced significant
population growth in the last decade. Obviously an increase of people in an area leads to an
increase in trash and pollutants. The issue for the environmental justice plaintiffs in Holly
Springs, however, was not whether the county needed a new landfill, but rather who should
bear the burden of a new facility. As a community with an existing landfill, was Holly Springs
the best choice for the siting of a new one? The residents of Holly Springs not only had a
common-sense notion of fairness on their side, but they also found support in laws that were
designed to protect communities such as theirs from injustices that result in environmental
decision making.
2. EMERGENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
In the early 1970s, the proliferation of toxic waste sites and groundwater contamination
converged with the emergence of other pollution problems to shift public perception of
pollution from that of a singular, localized problem to a pervasive, national issue.
42 The
development of environmental activism by way of mainstream environmental groups was
predominantly male, middle- to upper-middle class, and white.
43 Despite indications that
minorities and low-income groups were bearing the brunt of pollution hazards, few minority
members served on environmental organizational staffs or boards of directors.
44 One
explanation for the lack of minority participation in early environmental activism is that the
goal of mainstream environmentalists was to redistribute environmental threats rather than
eliminate them.
45 Thus, environmentalists, lawmakers, and agencies could influence outcomes
based on whatever prioritization these leaders deemed politically and economically
appropriate.
46 Given the “whiteness” of those in positions of power, minority interests were
not adequately represented.
47
                                                
42 See id. at 1227.
43 See id. at 1229
44 See id. at 1230.
45 See Evans, supra note 1, at 1228.
46 See id.
47 See id.6
Absent a minority presence, mainstream environmental groups took little notice of issues
relating to race, class, and discrimination in the provision of environmental services or the
imposition of environmental burdens.
48 Environmentalists were seen as ignoring both the
“urban environment” and the needs of the poor in favor of seeking “governmental assistance
to avoid the unpleasant externalities of the very system from which they themselves have
already benefited so extensively.”
49
While the interests of people of color were not given due consideration in early
environmental improvement efforts, distributive inequities were not going unnoticed. In 1982,
African-American residents of Warren County, North Carolina, engaged in a widespread
campaign of nonviolent civil disobedience to protest the state’s plan to dump over 6,000
truckloads of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) contaminated soil in their community.
50
Although the state enacted its plan in spite of the protests, which resulted in over 500 arrests,
Warren County residents succeeded in generating national awareness about the problem of
environmental racism.
51
In 1983, the publicity of these protests led to a study by the General Accounting Office
(GAO).
52 The GAO Report focused on racial and socioeconomic characteristics of
communities surrounding hazardous landfills.
53 The Report concluded that within the eight
southeastern states studied, despite the fact that African-Americans comprised only 20 percent
of the population, three of the four commercial hazardous-waste landfills were located in
predominantly African-American communities.
54 The GAO Report also identified a strong
correlation between race, poverty, and location of hazardous waste facilities.
55
In response to the GAO Report, the Commission for Racial Justice of the United Church
of Christ (UCC) undertook a comprehensive, nationwide study culminating in the 1987
issuance of “Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States: A National Report on the Racial
and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites” (UCC
Report).
56 Going further than the GAO study, the UCC Report concluded not just that race
was correlated with hazardous waste-site location, but that race was the single best predictor
of where hazardous waste facilities were located.
57 According to the UCC Report, race is a
                                                
48 See id. at 1232.
49 See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of Environmental
Protection, 87 N.W. U. L. REV. 787 (1992) (quoting Peter Marcuse, Conservation for Whom?, in James N.
Smith, The Coming of Age of Environmentalism in American Society, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN URBAN AMERICA (1974)).
50 See Amanda C.L. Vig, Using Title VI to Salvage Civil Rights from Waste: Chester Concerned for Quality
Living v. Seif, 67 U.C. IN. L. Rev. 907, 911 (1999).
51 See id.





57 See id. at 1248.7
better predictor than poverty, property values, home ownership, presence of uncontrolled
toxic waste sites, or amounts of hazardous waste generated by industry.
58
In 1990, the UCC Report was followed by an investigation by the National Law Journal
that focused on the regulatory response to hazardous waste contamination and specifically
considered whether there was any correlation between agency action and community
demographics.
59 Among its most significant findings, the study reported that the penalties
imposed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as well as the scope of remedial or
cleanup actions at hazardous waste sites differed between sites located in white versus
minority communities.
60 At sites located in white communities, agency action was faster,
cleanup remedies were superior, and penalties imposed on waste generators were stiffer than
at sites located in minority communities.
61 As in the GAO Report and the UCC Report, the
National Law Journal study also found that this racial imbalance occurred more often than
not regardless of the economic status of the community.
62
Critics of the evidence of race-based inequities in the distribution of toxic waste facilities
argue that rather than intentionally placing polluting facilities in poor and minority
neighborhoods, industrial or governmental actors are simply making an economic decision.
63
The cheapest land is often located near the most undesirable land uses, and poorer individuals
buy the cheaper land.
64 Furthermore, industry may situate facilities near the property of low-
income or minority groups not because those groups reside in the area, but because the land is
cheaper and already has mixed uses (residential, vacant, industrial, and commercial)—and
thus does not present the same expense and land-use compatibility problems that exist in other
areas.
65
 A frequently used pro-siting argument emphasizes the economic opportunity offered by
a proposed facility.
66 Siting advocates argue that the proposed facility will provide local
residents with economic opportunities not currently available to them.
67 Furthermore, siting
advocates point to the irony of the environmental justice position by noting that
environmental justice advocates protest the development of economic opportunities in
minority communities by arguing that hazardous waste facilities would pose too great a
burden on a community with a high rate of poverty and disempowerment.
68
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63 See Michael Wynne, Environmental Racism: Is a Nascent Social Science Concept a Sound Basis for
Legal Relief?, HOUSTON LAWYER, March/April 1998, at 34.
64 See id.
65 See id. at 35.
66 See Lisa A. Binder, Religion, Race, and Rights: A Rhetorical Overview of Environmental Justice
Disputes, 6 WIS. L.J. 1, 28 (1999).
67 See id.
68 See id.8
These economic explanations, however, fail to recognize that race plays a significant role
in siting decisions.
69 With obstacles such as limited financial resources, exclusionary and
expulsive zoning practices, and discrimination in employment and housing, minorities find
their mobility limited.
70 Furthermore, facilities are more apt to be located not only in
communities with cheaper land values, but also in communities lacking political power or
social status as well.
71 Minority communities, especially low-income minority communities,
tend to be unorganized and less involved in political processes, to lack resources, and to be
underrepresented on governing bodies—and thereby deprived of both information about and
ability to influence siting decisions.
72
The data provided by the studies discussed above prompted the EPA to create an
Environmental Equity Workgroup charged with the task of assessing evidence that racial
minority and low-income communities bear a higher environmental risk burden than the
general population and to consider what the EPA might do about it.
73 In 1992, the Workgroup
submitted a report that indicated that low-income and minority populations experience
disproportionate hazardous environmental exposures to certain pollutants compared to other
population groups.
74 The report concluded that environmental inequities are “deeply rooted in
historical patterns of commerce, geography, state and local land use decisions, and other
socioeconomic factors that affect where people live and work.”
75
3. ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM OR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE?
Evans distinguishes the concepts of environmental racism, environmental equity, and
environmental justice.
76 She notes that environmental racism includes the charge of racism as
an integral component of documented, disparate treatment in the distribution of environmental
risks and burdens across communities.
77 The prevalence of hazardous pollutants in minority
communities serves as support for this charge.
78 Environmental racism has more specifically
been defined as “[r]acial discrimination in environmental policymaking, in the enforcement of
regulations and laws, and the targeting of communities of color for toxic waste disposal and
siting of polluting industries.”
79
                                                
69 See Evans, supra note 1, at 1256.
70 See id. at 1257.
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 See Jimmy White, Environmental Justice: Is Disparate Impact Enough?, 50 MERCER L. REV. 1155, 1158
(1999).
74 See Evans, supra note 1, at 1250.
75 See id. (quoting ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. NO. 230-R-92-008, ENVIRONMENTAL
EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES, 6–7 (1992)).
76 See Evans, supra note 1, at 1266.
77 See id. at 1267.
78 See Lazarus, supra note 11, at 790.
79 See Barry E. Hill, Chester, Pennsylvania—Was It a Classic Example of Environmental Injustice?, 23 VT.
L. REV. 479, 486 (1999) (quoting Robert D. Bullard, Grassroots Flowering, THE AMICUS J., Spring 1994, at 32.)9
Environmental equity, however, encompasses the notion of fairness and involves the
balancing of the siting of potentially environmentally hazardous facilities among communities
of all backgrounds.
80 Rather than focusing on the underlying racial component to
environmental action, environmental equity focuses on fairness.
81 The premise here is that
fairness in environmental decision making would result in an even distribution of
environmental risks and burdens.
82 According to the EPA, environmental equity means
“[e]qual protection from environmental hazards for individual groups, or communities
regardless of race, ethnicity, or economic status.”
83
Finally, environmental justice seeks to relieve communities of the burden of waste
generation by forcing legislation designed to change modern industrial processes.
84
Environmental justice is based on the following premises: (1) all Americans have a basic right
to live and work in a healthy environment; (2) it is forward-looking and goal-oriented; (3) it is
a public health issue in addition to being an environmental issue; and (4) it is based on the
concept of fundamental fairness, which includes the concepts of economic and racial
prejudice.
85 Environmental justice has emerged as the more politically attractive expression,
presumably because it invokes a more positive and less divisive connotation.
86
Environmental racism and environmental equity appear to be incorporated into the
broader concept of environmental justice.
87 Environmental racism, however, looks to more
than just equitable distribution of risks and hazards.
88 As discussed above, environmental
racism entails the charge that racism is an integral component of decisions regarding the
distribution of environmental burdens. For the sake of convenience, this paper will use the
terms “environmental racism” and “environmental justice” interchangeably since the former
is encompassed within the latter.
Swanston emphasizes that environmental justice is about land: public and private
landownership, land use, access to land, and land management and policy.
89 Landownership
has historically played a significant role in economic status and quality of life; hence
discrimination in land use and ownership has contributed to environmental inequities faced by
minority communities.
90 In fact, even after legal barriers to property ownership were
                                                
80 See Evans, supra note 1, at 1267.
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 See Hill, supra note 38, at 487 (quoting U.S. EPA, PUB. NO. 520/B-94-001 GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL
ISSUES—EARTH DAY 25 edition 53 (1995).
84 See id. at 1268.
85 See Hill, supra note 38, at 487-88.
86 See Lazarus, supra note 11, at 790.
87 See Evans, supra note 1, at 1268.
88 See id. at 1271.
89 See Samara F. Swanston, Environmental Justice and Environmental Quality Benefits: The Oldest, Most
Pernicious Struggle and Hope for Burdened Communities, 23 VT. L. REV. 545, 546 (1999).
90 See id. at 350.10
overcome, discrimination continued to limit the ability of people of color, particularly
African-Americans, to own property.
91
Issues of environmental justice are a growing concern among civil rights groups.
92
Litigants have therefore used civil rights laws to address problems of environmental justice.
93
However, plaintiffs have in general been unsuccessful in proving claims of environmental
racism at trial.
94
4. THE PROBLEM WITH THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in part that “no State
shall…deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
95 The
promise of the Equal Protection Clause, however, has faded as the Supreme Court has steadily
increased the evidentiary hurdles that must be surmounted before finding a violation of the
clause.
96 Facially discriminatory laws and actions have become rare in today’s race-conscious
society.
97 Therefore, equal protection claims in the environmental justice context are likely to
allege that a governmental decision which is facially neutral is nonetheless discriminatory.
98
The current understanding of when a facially neutral decision or action can be considered
discriminatory was established with two cases in the 1970s. In Washington v. Davis
99and
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation
100 the Supreme Court
held that plaintiffs claiming a violation of the Equal Protection Clause must demonstrate that
government officials intentionally discriminated against them.
101 The Court interpreted the
intent requirement to demand that claimants demonstrate that race “has been a motivating
factor in the decision,” and that the decision was made not merely in spite of, but in part
“because of,” its adverse effect on the class.
102
In Arlington Heights, the Court acknowledged that governmental decision making rarely
involves a single motivating purpose, but rather involves multiple actors and thereby requires
examination of circumstantial evidence to prove discriminatory intent.
103 The Court identified
five factors as potentially probative of intentional discrimination: (1) disparate impact, (2)
                                                
91 See id.
92 See Maura Lynn Tierney, Environmental Justice and Title VI Challenges to Permit Decisions: The EPA’s
Interim Guidance, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1277, 1281 (1999).
93 See id.
94 See Vig, supra note 12, at 912.
95 U.S. CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT XIV, 1.
96 See Kaswan, supra note 3, at 407.
97 See id. at 408.
98 See id.
99 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
100 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
101 See Bradford C. Mank, Is There a Private Cause of Action under EPA’s Title VI Regulations?: The Need
to Empower Environmental Justice Plaintiffs, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 10 (1999).
102 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
103 See id.11
historical background to the decision, (3) history of the decision-making process, (4)
departures from normal substantive factors or procedures, and (5) legislative or administrative
history.
104
Kaswan argues that this test provides the framework that is likely to be invoked in an
equal protection challenge to the siting of an undesirable land use.
105 Plaintiffs challenging a
siting decision bear the burden of proving that the decision maker was motivated by a
discriminatory purpose.
106 At that point, the burden of proof shifts to the decision maker to
show “that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not
been considered.”
107
In environmental racism cases, courts have failed to find evidence of intentional
discrimination because siting boards and developers can almost always offer at least some
race-neutral justification for a site.
108 For example, in Bean v. Southwestern Waste
Management Corporation,
109 plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, alleging racial
discrimination in the Texas Department of Health’s decision to grant a permit for the
operation of a solid waste facility in a predominantly minority area of Harris County,
Texas.
110 The plaintiffs used the Arlington Heights factors to prove their case by
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory purpose.
111 Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that
the “Texas Department of Health’s approval of the permit was part of a pattern or
practice…of discriminating in the placement of solid waste sites” and that its approval was
discriminatory “in the context of the historical placement of solid waste sites and the events
surrounding the application.”
112 The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that
the siting was within a minority “census tract” and hence there was no evident pattern of
discriminatory practice.
113 The court also found that the historical evidence presented was
insufficient to infer purposeful racial discrimination.
114
Seven years after the Bean decision, in East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-
Bibb County Planning & Zoning Commission,
115 on equal protection grounds plaintiffs
challenged a decision to grant a permit authorizing the siting of a landfill in a community that
was 70 percent African-American.
116 The court analyzed plaintiffs’ evidence using the five-
factor Arlington Heights test.
117 For the first factor, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’
                                                
104 See id. at 268. See also Kaswan, supra note 3, at 411.
105 See Kaswan, supra note 43.
106 See id. at 413.
107 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 271. See also Kaswan, supra note 3, at 414.
108 See Mank, supra note 63, at 11.
109 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff’d without op., 782 F.2d 1038 (5
th Cir. 1986).
110 See White, supra note 35, at 1163.
111 See Kaswan, supra note 3, at 434.
112 See id.
113 See Kaswan, supra note 3, at 450.
114 See id.
115 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aff’d, 896 F.2d 1264 (11
th Cir. 1989).
116 See Kaswan, supra note 3, at 440.
117 See id.12
assertion of discriminatory impact by noting that the only other landfill approved by the
Commission was located in a white census tract.
118 Although the court acknowledged that
both of these census tracts and their landfills fell within the same county district and that the
district was primarily African-American, it found that this evidence was insufficient “to
establish a clear pattern of racially motivated decisions.”
119
In applying the second Arlington Heights factor, the court looked to the history of the
Commission’s prior decisions.
120 In rejecting the claim of a long history of siting undesirable
land uses in black neighborhoods, the court noted that many of the siting decisions were made
by agencies other than the Commission and concluded that such evidence “shed little if any
light upon the alleged discriminatory intent of the Commission.”
121
Looking at the third Arlington Heights factor, the court found no persuasive evidence that
the sequence of events associated with the Commission’s approval of the landfill application
revealed a discriminatory purpose.
122 Turning to the fourth Arlington Heights factor, the court
found no evidence that the Commission had violated any procedural or substantive
requirements.
123 Finally, with respect to the fifth factor, the legislative history of the decision,
the court concluded that the individual commissioners’ justification for reversing the earlier
denial of an application for a landfill at the site were not motivated by discriminatory
purposes.
124
In another equal protection challenge to a landfill, a community organization in R.I.S.E.,
Inc. v. Kay
125 alleged that it was denied equal protection when the County Board of
Supervisors approved the siting of a regional landfill in a predominantly African-American
section of the county.
126 The court examined all but the fifth Arlington Heights factor in
rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim.
127 Despite finding that from 1969 to 1991 the placement of
landfills in the area had had a disproportionate impact on African-American residents, the
court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim because “the Equal Protection Clause did not impose an
affirmative duty to equalize the impact of official decisions on different racial groups.”
128
This conclusion was reached notwithstanding the evidence suggesting that some decision
makers held discriminatory views, or the fifth factor of Arlington Heights, legislative
history.
129
The fact that government agencies may be able to escape responsibility for siting
decisions by arguing that key location decisions are made by private, not state, actors presents
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a significant hurdle for using the Equal Protection Clause in the environmental racism
context.
130 However, to the extent that state actors retain the authority to approve or
disapprove private applications, their decisions are subject to the requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause.
131 Kaswan argues, for example, that in East Bibb Twiggs, the court should
have analyzed whether the Commission’s past approval and denial of applications could have
been correlated with race.
132
As the above discussion indicates, demonstrating discriminatory purpose is a difficult
task for plaintiffs challenging a siting decision on environmental grounds. However, the cases
show that environmental justice plaintiffs should be aware of certain essential components to
an equal protection claim. These include facts about disparate impacts, about historical
circumstances, about decision-making processes, about the rules and procedures guiding the
decision, and about what decision makers have said and done in making their decisions.
133
5. EPA’S REGULATIONS UNDER TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964
Lazarus noted that much of environmental protection lawmaking has been highly centralized,
with lawmakers at the federal level creating most of the legislation aimed at ameliorating
environmental problems.
134 Environmental legislation has been produced through intense and
lengthy “horse-trading” among interest groups.
135 This process has often depended upon the
forging of alliances between diverse interests both within the environmental public interest
community and within the government bureaucracy.
136 These unions have included what has
been called “unholy alliances” between environmentalists and commercial and industrial
interests, where the latter have perceived an economic advantage to be gained (or
disadvantage minimized) by supporting an environmental protection law which allocates the
benefits and burdens of environmental protection in a particular fashion.
137 Therefore, it is not
surprising that the environmental laws enacted by the U.S. Congress typically address some,
but not all, environmental pollution problems.
138
Federal and state environmental agencies began expressing concern for the distributional
implications of environmental laws in general and of their own actions in particular.
139 In
1990, the EPA formed the Environmental Equity Workgroup to study environmental
justice.
140 In 1992, the Workgroup published a report assessing the evidence for
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disproportionate distribution of environmental risks.
141 The EPA also established the national
Office of Environmental Justice to coordinate the agency’s environmental justice efforts.
142
In 1994, in response to the EPA’s failure to enforce its own regulations, President
William J. Clinton published Executive Order No. 12,898, which acknowledged the existence
of environmental inequity and directed employees of the Executive Branch—environmental
regulators; those responsible for rule making, permitting, and enforcement; agency lawyers;
and others—to include environmental equity in their decision-making calculus.
143
Specifically, the Order required all federal agencies to promote environmental justice “[t]o the
greatest extent practicable and permitted by law.”
144
In a presidential directive issued simultaneously with the Executive Order, federal
agencies providing funding to programs affecting human health or the environment were
required to ensure that their grant recipients comply with the anti-discrimination provisions in
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
145 The directive, however, is not judicially
enforceable and does not expand existing Title VI rights.
146
Where disproportionate burden has been identified, the environmental justice movement
has focused on using or creating remedies that are triggered by evidence of disparate
impact.
147 Existing authority includes EPA regulations implementing Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act.
148 Title VI forbids any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance
from denying benefits or discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin.
149
Title VI contains two separate sections that provide enforcement mechanisms.
150 Under
section 601, private citizens may file a private lawsuit challenging the discriminatory actions
of any recipient of federal funds; however, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the recipient
has consciously discriminated against the minority group.
151 Under section 602, agencies may
promulgate regulations that prohibit practices creating unjustified discriminatory effects.
152
The EPA, for example, has promulgated regulations that prohibit recipients from engaging in
practices that cause disparate impacts.
153
Although the language of Title VI does not specify whether proof of discriminatory intent
or impact is necessary, the Supreme Court held in Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service
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Commission of New York
154 that it can be expanded to include disparate impact if agency
regulations so provide.
155 The Court concluded that proof of intentional discrimination under
section 601 of Title VI was necessary, but that an agency implementing regulations under
section 602 may prohibit disparate impact discrimination.
156 Hence, the EPA regulations
implementing Title VI expand the original scope of the Civil Rights Act, allowing plaintiffs to
bring Title VI claims on the basis of disparate impact in addition to discriminatory intent.
157
Under EPA regulations, recipients of EPA financial assistance are required to agree
annually in writing to comply with Title VI and the EPA civil rights regulations.
158 As of
1995, however, the EPA had not completed a single investigation of any civil rights complaint
and had never investigated whether a recipient of EPA financial assistance was fulfilling its
obligations to comply with the requirements of the civil rights regulations.
159
6. CHESTER CONCERNED FOR QUALITY LIVING V. SEIF: AN
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM SUCCESS UNDER TITLE VI OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964?
Chester, Pennsylvania, a small city near Philadelphia, is inhabited primarily by African-
Americans.
160 One-quarter of the city’s residents live below the poverty line.
161 Chester is
plagued with problems such as inadequate public housing and high rates of truancy, crime,
teen-age pregnancy, infant mortality, homelessness, AIDS, and drug abuse.
162 In the early
1970s, a Chester resident began leasing land to a hazardous waste disposal company, which
stored the hazardous waste in drums or emptied it directly onto the soil.
163 In February 1978,
one of the largest chemical waste fires in this country’s history erupted on the property.
164
Today Chester is a city of 42,000 people, has no McDonald’s or Burger King—or a
public swimming pool—yet by 1993 had five different waste facilities.
165 All of the solid
waste in the county and 85 percent of its raw sewage are treated in Chester.
166 Furthermore,
Chester has the highest infant mortality rate and the highest death rate resulting from certain
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malignant tumors of any city in Pennsylvania.
167 These facilities, however, brought money
and jobs to a community where most of the industrial base has departed and the property taxes
are among the highest in the county.
168
Some residents, however, were concerned about the effects that the facilities were having
on their communities. Opposition to any new hazardous waste facilities led some residents to
organize into a group called the Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living (CRCQL), a
nonprofit organization.
169 In 1996, CRCQL brought suit against the Pennsylvania Department
of Environmental Protection (PADEP), alleging that, by burdening Chester with a disparate
impact of the county’s pollution, PADEP was violating both section 601 of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the EPA regulations made pursuant to section 602 of the Civil
Rights Act.
170
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed the plaintiffs’
allegations of discrimination because an implied cause of action under section 601 was
limited to cases of intentional discrimination.
171 The court also refused to recognize a private
right of action under Title VI’s section 602 regulations.
172 The Third Circuit Court, however,
reversed that decision and held that a private right of action may exist under these
regulations.
173 By finding a cause of action in section 602, Chester established that a Title VI
plaintiff may succeed on a showing of disparate impact.
174
The potential of Chester’s impact is grounded in the differing burdens carried by the
defendant under section 601 and section 602.
175 Equal Protection Clause precedents define the
parameters of section 601.
176 Therefore, under the Arlington Heights standard, defendants
facing a section 601 claim are able to rebut claims of disparate impact under the Equal
Protection Clause with a nondiscriminatory reason for the discriminatory effect.
177 In contrast,
under section 602, a defendant can rebut a claim of disparate impact only with showing that
the disparate impact has a “manifest relation” to the specific agency action in question, thus
creating a more demanding burden on the defendant.
178
On June 8, 1998, the Supreme Court granted the PADEP’s petition for a writ of certiorari
to review the Third Circuit’s determination that a plaintiff may bring a private right of action
under section 602.
179 On April 30, 1998, before the Supreme Court granted the petitioner’s
petition for a writ of certiorari, PADEP revoked the underlying permit in the case after it had
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expired and the permit applicant had indicated that it no longer planned to site a facility in
Chester.
180 CRCQL filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot on July 29, 1998.
181 The
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in turn filed a brief in opposition, arguing that the case
remained justiciable despite the revocation of the permit to vacate the Third Circuit’s decision
to prevent the case from being cited as precedent in the future if the court dismissed the case
as moot.
182 On August 17, 1998, the Supreme Court granted both the CRCQL’s petition to
dismiss the case as moot and Pennsylvania’s request to vacate the Third Circuit’s decision.
183
As a result, environmental justice plaintiffs may not cite the Third Circuit decision as
precedent in their attempts to prevail on environmental justice claims.
7. POST-CHESTER ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE DEVELOPMENTS
In February 1998, the EPA’s Office of Civil Rights (OCR) issued an “Interim Guidance for
Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits” (Interim
Guidance).
184 The Interim Guidance provides a framework for the investigation and
processing of Title VI administrative complaints alleging discriminatory impact resulting
from the issuance of permits.
185 First, within twenty days of acknowledging receipt, the OCR
determines whether to reject or accept the complaint.
186 Second, if the complaint is accepted,
the OCR conducts a factual investigation to determine whether the issuance of the permit will
have a new disparate impact or add to an existing disparate impact on the minority
population.
187 Third, upon a conclusion that a significant disparate impact will result, the
Interim Guidance allows the recipient of EPA funding to rebut the finding, propose a
mitigation plan, or justify the impact.
188 If the recipient fails to meet these requirements, the
OCR then notifies the recipient in writing that the EPA has made a preliminary finding of
noncompliance, which may result in revocation of funding.
189
Regarding permitting requirements, the Interim Guidance includes a broad framework for
establishing a prima facie case for disparate impact, requires permit applicants to consider
demographics for their operating permits, and allows permit challenges to be raised for new,
modified, and renewal permits after an original permit has already been issued.
190 In terms of
legal requirements, the Interim Guidance shifts the ultimate burden of proof in establishing a
disparate impact to the permitting agency and creates a private right of action.
191
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State and local governments, industries, and even some environmental justice advocates
have opposed the Interim Guidance.
192 Governments and industries view the Interim
Guidance as burdensome, while environmental justice advocates believe it is insufficient.
193
During October 1998, President Clinton signed an appropriations bill that included a rider that
placed a moratorium on the EPA’s accepting new Title VI complaints until the agency issues
a final guidance on Title VI.
194 Tierney suggests that the final guidance should balance the
interests of economic development with those of environmental justice,
195 allow for
community involvement in the decision-making process,
196 and consider sustainable urban
redevelopment as an important policy objective.
197
8. SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS CAN FACILITATE ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE
Environmental laws may establish substantive and/or procedural requirements for the siting of
particular types of land use.
198 An example of a substantive standard might be a state
environmental law that governs the siting of solid waste facilities by establishing location
standards specifying that the facility must be a certain distance away from sources of water,
parks, or residences.
199 To illustrate an example of a procedural requirement, the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires the preparation of an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) in connection with any major federal action having significant effects on the
environment.
200
Although the NEPA requirements apply only to action involving the federal government,
many states have adopted similar environmental review statutes applicable to state projects.
201
These state environmental policy acts (SEPAs) require state governments to consider a wide
range of health, economic, social, and cultural impacts before taking action that affects the
environment.
202 SEPAs can therefore be valuable tools for achieving environmental justice.
203
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For example, Minnesota’s environmental review law provides that
[n]o state action significantly affecting the quality of the environment shall be allowed, nor
shall any permit for natural resources management and development be granted, where such
action or permit has caused or is likely to cause pollution, impairment, or destruction of the
air, water, land or other natural resources located within the state, so long as there is a
feasible and prudent alternative consistent with the reasonable requirements of the public
health, safety, and welfare.
204
Procedural requirements help to generate a great deal of information about the site under
consideration.
205 The NEPA, for example, requires the EIS to discuss the purpose and need
for the proposed action, the environment to be affected, and the consequences of the proposed
project to that environment such as ecological, aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic, social,
or health effects.
206 Other sources of information other than the EIS that result from NEPA’s
review process include comments from the public and other agencies having jurisdiction over
or an interest in the proposed project as well as information about alternatives to the selected
site.
207
Public participation provisions, which require public input in siting decisions, empower
communities, providing them with a voice in the decision-making process.
208 In addition, the
government decision-making process is benefited as well.
209 For example, community
residents are “experts” in their knowledge of where they live in that they know more about
their community than the government agency making the siting decisions that would affect
that area.
210 Information that these experts provide regarding opposition to siting in their
community might enable the decision-making agency to identify alternatives to the proposed
action.
211
Kaswan argues that substantive and procedural requirements within environmental laws
could provide factual information relevant to the five Arlington Heights factors discussed
above.
212 She notes that in cases involving environmental-justice equal-protection challenges,
courts have often found that substantive and procedural requirements were in fact followed.
213
If, however, more detailed substantive and procedural requirements were within the laws,
deviations from those requirements could support an inference of discriminatory intent.
214
Although information gathered to satisfy substantive and procedural requirements may not
reveal any evidence of a discriminatory purpose in the siting decision, it has a potential to
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play a role in a community’s effort to show that a siting decision violated the Equal Protection
Clause.
215
The Holly Springs case discussed in part 1 illustrates how substantive and procedural
requirements within environmental laws can protect communities from lax or even biased
decision making in siting hazardous waste facilities. There is a strong argument that the Holly
Springs plaintiffs would not have been successful if they had had to rely solely on the Equal
Protection Clause and/or Title VI to support their argument that environmental injustice had
occurred. The substantive and procedural requirements in North Carolina’s environmental
laws were crucial to the Holly Springs plaintiffs’ success in combating an unjust
environmental decision. 
CONCLUSION
As environmental justice advocates push for increased and improved legislation designed to
more fairly distribute environmental benefits and burdens, substantive and procedural laws
regulating the siting of hazardous waste facilities will become more important to ensuring
environmental justice. Community involvement is a critical component that should be
included in the process of siting of hazardous waste facilities. Specific substantive and
procedural regulations combined with local approval requirements will provide plaintiffs
challenging siting decisions with legal arguments that avoid the obstacles of the Equal
Protection Clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.
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